U.S. pharmaceutical regulations are based on the principle that patients should not be exposed to new prescription drugs until their efficacy and safety have been shown. Since 1962, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Congress have balanced the efficient review of investiga tional drugs with the need to withhold judgment until sufficient evidence is available to clarify the benefit-risk relationship. Misjudging these competing interests in either direction causes important problems. On the one hand, the evi dentiary hurdles of the FDA are often criticized by pharmaceutical companies and patient advo cacy groups for slowing access to promising therapies. On the other hand, truncated premar ket review can lead to the approval of drugs that are ineffective, unsafe, or both. These dangers were once again made clear in October 2013 when approval was briefly sus pended for ponatinib, a medication to treat leu kemia that had been approved just the year be fore on an accelerated basis. Emerging data showed that 24% of the patients who had been followed for a median of 1.3 years and 48% of those who had been followed for a median of 2.7 years had serious thromboembolic events, including myocardial infarction and stroke. 1 The drug was allowed back on the market in December 2013 with more limited indications and a restricted distribution system.
The latest development in the FDA approach to ensuring the safety and effectiveness of mar keted prescription drugs occurred in July 2012, when Congress created a new category of "break through therapy" in the FDA Safety and Inno vation Act (FDASIA). A breakthrough therapy was defined as a new product to treat a serious disease for which preliminary clinical evidence suggested substantial superiority over existing options on one or more clinically significant end points. 2 Lawmakers intended the designation to speed to market a limited number of prod ucts that showed "exceptional results for pa tients." 3 Lauded by policymakers, 4 consumer advocates, 5, 6 and the FDA itself, 7 the break throughdrug pathway has been embraced by industry 8 and has produced early results far ex ceeding predictions. From October 2012 through September 2013, the FDA received 92 applica tions for the breakthroughtherapy designation, of which 27 were approved and 41 denied (24 applications were still pending). 9 Although some of these agents may end up being truly transfor mative for patient care, the breakthroughtherapy designation also raises the possibility of a surge in new drugs that have been approved on the basis of limited clinical data.
There is ongoing controversy over the FDA standards for the approval of investigational drugs. In this article, we briefly summarize pri or government efforts to expedite the availabil ity of new therapeutics, and we discuss the clin ical, ethical, and regulatory implications of the breakthroughtherapy designation.
HIS TORY OF E ARLY-ACCESS AND E XPEDITED -APPROVAL PROGR AMS
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938 prohibited the routine therapeutic use of investigational drugs, although in practice phy sicians easily obtained such drugs outside of clinical trials. 10 A sea change came when the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the FDCA required affirmative FDA approval on the basis of trials in humans before new drugs could be marketed. Regulations in 1963 divided these trials into three phases -small, phase 1 safety trials; intermediatesize, phase 2 efficacy studies; and large, controlled, phase 3 studies -form ing the basis for a new drug application (NDA).
There was concern that extended study be fore approval could prevent timely patient access to potentially lifesaving medicines. The FDA first responded by adopting pathways to allow treat ment use before approval. In the 1960s, early access programs (also called compassionateuse programs) allowed limited patient access to inves tigational drugs, although these programs had no written rules and were flexibly applied. The demand for experimental cancer drugs was particularly strong, leading the FDA to publish in 1979 its first official earlyaccess policy for such drugs.
Pressure from physicians and patients inten sified with the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, a pivotal episode in the evolution of the FDA drugapprov al policies. Demonstrations by AIDS activists at FDA headquarters brought widespread attention to the lag times between submission and agency approval of new medications, 11 although the perception that the FDA did not rapidly assess drugs intended for patients with human immuno deficiency virus (HIV) infection may have been exaggerated. 12 In 1987, regulations for treatment investigational new drug applications (treatment INDs) formalized the procedures for obtaining early access to investigational drugs outside of clinical trials. 13 Three years later, the FDA pro posed making unapproved drugs for HIV/AIDS available even sooner by means of a parallel track mechanism 14 for patients with HIV/AIDS who were unable to enroll in clinical trials.
In the 1980s, earlyaccess options were joined by FDA initiatives to hasten drug approval. In 1988, the FDA created a fasttrack component (Subpart E) of its rules to "expedite the develop ment, evaluation, and marketing of new thera pies" 15 for serious and lifethreatening condi tions by, for example, eliminating phase 3 trials. The provisions were modeled on the testing and approval of the HIV drug zidovudine, which oc curred over a period of only 2 years and includ ed a single, welldesigned phase 2 trial. In 1992, the FDA initiated an acceleratedapproval path way (Subpart H) to allow approval on the basis of surrogate end points that were seen as reason ably likely to predict patient benefit. 16 Subpart H shortened the clinicalinvestigation process by permitting trials to end before the occurrence of hard clinical end points (e.g., hospitalization, myocardial infarction, and death).
The same year that the FDA finalized Subpart H, Congress enacted the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), which authorized the FDA to collect "user fees" from pharmaceutical manu facturers. Although increased Congressional ap propriations to the FDA had already reduced NDA review times by the late 1980s, 17 PDUFA allowed the FDA to hire more scientists and fur ther expedite the review of drug applications. 18 PDUFA also set formal deadlines of 6 months for priority applications and 12 months for stan dard applications (shortened to 10 months in 2002). Within 1 year after the enactment of PDUFA, the FDA had acted on 93% of NDAs within the new deadlines. 19 The user fees were restricted to the approval of products; it was not until 2007 that the FDA had the authority to allo cate them to postapproval drugsafety activities. 20 Under FDASIA, the FDA review deadlines now begin to run 60 days after NDA submission. 21 
BENEFIT S AND RISK S OF E XPANDED ACCESS AND E ARLY APPROVAL
The FDA has estimated that more than 100,000 patients have received investigational drugs for serious or lifethreatening conditions through the use of treatment INDs. 22 For investigational drugs that ultimately prove to be superior to ex isting options, these earlyaccess programs ben efit patients by allowing new therapies to reach them sooner. In addition, expedited development and approval programs have shortened the clini cal development period, allowing earlier access for the broader patient population. Subpart E, for example, reduced the average clinical develop ment time from 8.9 to 6.2 years, whereas drugs benefiting from accelerated approval averaged just 4.2 years. 23 NDA review times have also de creased dramatically, from more than 30 months in the 1980s to 14.5 months by 1997 24 and to 9.9 months for applications received in 2011. 25 The immediate result of PDUFA was a spike in approvals during the mid1990s as backlogged applications were processed, 26 but the number of approvals each year soon returned to histori cal averages. 27 Although the FDA was once con sidered by some to approve drugs too slowly, 28 drug approvals since 2000 have been quicker in the United States than in Canada or Europe. From 2001 through 2010, the FDA approved 64% of novel therapeutic agents earlier than the European Medicines Agency. 29 However, early access and shortened develop ment and review times have also been associat ed with negative public health outcomes. Drugs approved shortly before the PDUFAimposed deadlines have been found to be more likely to have postmarketing safety problems -includ ing safety withdrawals and added blackbox warnings -than were drugs approved at any other time. 30, 31 Other investigators have report ed that drugs receiving faster reviews have more spontaneous reports of drugrelated adverse events, although these data are controversial. [32] [33] [34] [35] Among drugs first approved abroad, those with more foreignmarket experience before U.S. ap proval are less often associated with serious ad verse drug reactions. 35, 36 Such findings are predictable because of the more limited data on which expedited drug ap provals are based. Although neither the fasttrack nor the acceleratedapproval pathways changed the legal standard for approval -which is still effectiveness with acceptable risk -they reduced the quantity of evidence needed to meet this standard and altered the nature of that evidence. For example, cancer drugs approved during the previous decade on the basis of limited clinical trials -nonrandomized, unblinded, single group, phase 1 and phase 2 trials that used inter mediate end points rather than patient survival -had a 72% greater odds of serious adverse events occurring in their pivotal trials than did cancer drugs that were approved with more rigorous studies. 37 A recent study showed that drugs benefiting from expedited approval pro grams were tested for efficacy in a median of only 104 patients, as compared with 580 pa tients for nonexpedited review. 38 Data collected with the use of earlystage clinicaltrial methods are unstable and may be subsequently disproved in larger, morerigorous trials.
Concerns about potentially inaccurate assess ments of the benefit-risk ratios led the FDA, be ginning in approximately 1970, to condition some approvals on the conduct of postapproval (phase 4) confirmatory studies. The proportion of new drugs that were subject to these post approval obligations increased from approximate ly 30% in the early 1980s to approximately 80% in the early 2000s. 39 Unfortunately, the perfor mance of these followup studies has often been markedly delayed 40 or not initiated at all. 41 Gemtuzumab ozogamicin was approved in 2000 for the treatment of a rare type of leukemia on the basis of limited data, but it was withdrawn from the market in 2010 after confirmatory tri als initiated in 2004 showed increased mortality and no efficacy. 42 Concern over the timely conduct of post Completion times also appear to range widely: a report from the Office of Oncology Drug Products regarding a sample of oncology drugs approved by way of the acceleratedapproval pathway showed that it took 0.8 to 12.6 years before postmarketing trials were completed (median, 3.9 years). 44 Bedaquiline, a medication for the treatment of multidrugresistant (MDR) tuberculosis, was ap proved in 2012 on the basis of the surrogate end point of sputumculture conversion, even though the pivotal studies also showed an incidence of death (generally from tuberculosis) that was five times as high among patients given the drug than among those randomly assigned to receive standard treatment for MDR tuberculosis. The impact on individual patients must be further studied since there is a need for additional treat ment options for this highly contagious disease. The confirmatory randomized trial that was mandated for bedaquiline was not required by the FDA to be completed until 2022. 45 
BRE AK THROUGH THER APY -R ATIONALE AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
In approving FDASIA, Congress anticipated that the use of modern evaluation tools earlier in the drugdevelopment cycle could result in "fewer, smaller, or shorter clinical trials." During Con gressional hearings in 2012, advocacy and in dustry organizations supported the creation of the new breakthroughtherapy designation to abbre viate or combine traditional clinical phases to enhance earlier patient access. 46, 47 Support for the law also came from officials within the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research who, in November 2013, praised the "much larger treat ment effect" achieved by some recent "molecu larly targeted therapies" that aim to benefit sub groups of patients with "cancer, genetic diseases, and . . . other serious illnesses." 7 The article defended the new expediteddevelopment pro gram, suggesting that "when a large effect in a serious disease is observed early in drug devel opment, it seems excessive to conduct a prolonged clinical development program that encompasses traditional trial phases." 7 According to this view, the new designation could make possible stream lined clinical development that would lead to more rapid approval. The breakthroughtherapy designation is the latest addition to the expandedaccess and expe ditedapproval programs of the FDA (Table 1) . In recent years, the exceptions have been more common than the rule; among the 39 new drugs approved in 2012, a total of 22 (56%) were approved by means of at least one of the acceleratedapproval, fasttrack, and priority re view programs, and 9 of these (23% of the total) qualified for more than one program.
Regulatory efficiency was identified as a ma jor outcome of the breakthroughtherapy desig nation, 8 but the benefits offered in FDASIA are already largely available through existing legis lation, regulations, or standard FDA practice. For example, FDASIA commits the FDA to work ing closely with sponsors of breakthrough ther apies. 7 However, Subpart E (1988) offered "early consultation between FDA and drug sponsors," emphasized the importance of meeting with the FDA to ensure efficient phase 2 trial design, and specified that senior FDA officials would active ly facilitate the conduct and evaluation of clini cal trials. 56 FDASIA notes that breakthrough therapies may also benefit from the assignment of a "crossdisciplinary project lead" to facilitate efficient review, but it is unclear how this will improve on existing coordination of staff efforts.
The breakthroughtherapy designation con tinued the trend of applying increasingly flexi ble evidentiary standards to determine the quali fication for expedited development and approval programs. Certain drugs have long been ap proved on the basis of wellestablished surro gate end points. 51 The acceleratedapproval pathway (1992) began to allow approval on the basis of "less than wellestablished surrogate endpoint [s] ." 51 By contrast, one way to qualify for the new breakthroughtherapy designation (2012) is by showing "an effect on a pharmaco dynamic biomarker(s) that does not meet crite ria for an acceptable surrogate endpoint, but strongly suggests the potential for a clinically meaningful effect on the underlying disease." 55 This more flexible standard would apply to a broader range of potential new therapies. The law requires that breakthrough drugs must even tually be approved or rejected under the normal FDA approval standards, but as was seen with the bedaquiline approval for MDR tuberculosis, such confirmation may not be required for years. 45 Once the breakthroughtherapy status has been granted on the basis of preliminary evi dence, it may be difficult to temper demand (whether early access or postapproval) even if the drug is revealed to be less effective or more harmful than initially believed. Decision theory suggests that when a decision is less reversible, more care should be taken in reaching the ini tial determination. 57 This tension emerged most recently around bevacizumab, which was ap proved for the treatment of metastatic breast cancer on the basis of surrogate end points under the acceleratedapproval pathway. When subse quent studies showed no increase in patient sur vival, withdrawing the indication took nearly a year and generated substantial opposition. 58 Some insurers still cover offlabel use of the drug for this non-evidencebased purpose.
Deferring rigorous study until after a drug is approved can also undermine and delay evalua tion of its benefit-risk profile. 38 Once a drug is approved, enrolling patients in clinical trials to determine efficacy is more challenging than be fore approval, because patients have the choice of receiving the drug in the normal course of therapy or enrolling in a trial in which they may be randomly assigned to usual care. This con cern is magnified when deferred study is paired with earlier designations that may be interpret ed as official endorsements.
CONCLUSIONS
The 27 breakthroughtherapy designations grant ed by the FDA in the first 9 months of 2013 are unlikely to represent a sudden and dramatic in crease in the pace of pharmaceutical innovation, given that an average of 25 new molecular enti ties were approved annually during the previous decade. Another interpretation of the rapid pop ularity of the designation is that it has created the appearance of progress while enhancing the visibility of promising earlystage drugs that may be no more likely than before FDASIA to confer large benefits to patients. The breakthrough therapy designation is also likely to further in crease public pressure on the FDA to approve such products. Few would argue about the need for pathways to bring safe and effective new drugs to market quickly, especially for life threatening diseases for which current treatment options are inadequate. Efforts to promote early access, expedited development, and early ap proval have existed for decades. Unfortunately, these efforts generally have not been followed by equally energetic efforts to develop rigorous con firmatory data that could refine the indications for the drug or even change its approval status. There has also been little discussion of the implications of approving breakthrough drugs on the basis of limited data for patients consid ering therapeutic options and for their physi cians. Expedited approval has been championed by patient advocacy groups who think that FDA requirements that delay access to new products infringe on personal autonomy. Of course, this view is not universal among patients. 59 How will patients make informed choices about break through drugs approved with new clinicaltrial techniques rather than with traditional random ized trials?
This question is particularly salient for pa tients with lifethreatening illness. Previous re search has uncovered important deficiencies in decision making by patients in such precarious situations. One survey showed that, as compared with healthier patients, severely ill patients had less retention of the information that was dis cussed in the informedconsent process and lessclear understanding of the risks of ther apy. 60 Some have suggested that insurers will act as an effective counterweight in the post approval marketplace by refusing to cover break through products with clinical activity that is either unconfirmed or does not justify the high cost. 61 In Europe, centralized payers serve as a barrier to the widespread use of available but marginally useful clinical therapies. 62, 63 However, in the United States, the greater fragmentation of the insurance market and the greater sense of entitlement to all available treatments make it unlikely that this counterbalance will be as effective.
Even before the first breakthrough drug has been approved, lawmakers have started discuss ing the next pathway aimed at further reducing evidentiary requirements to speed drugs to mar ket. 64 On December 12, 2013, a bill was intro duced in Congress that would allow the approval of new antibiotic and antifungal medicines on the basis of alternative end points and data sets of limited size so long as the labeling promi nently stated that the drugs were indicated for use in a limited and specific population of pa tients. 65 The bill did not restrict the ability to prescribe such drugs offlabel. In the next few years, evidence will accumulate to indicate how well the new breakthroughtherapy designation improves the options of patients with serious and intractable diseases and to what extent it facilitates the market entry of treatments that promise more than they can deliver.
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